Abstract. Key distribution for multimedia live streaming peer-to-peer overlay networks is a field still in its childhood stage. A scheme designed for networks of this kind must seek security and efficiency while keeping in mind the following restrictions: limited bandwidth, continuous playing, great audience size and clients churn. This paper introduces two novel schemes that allow a trade-off between security and efficiency by allowing to dynamically vary the number of levels used in the key hierarchy. These changes are motivated by great variations in audience size, and initiated by decision of the Key Server. Additionally, a comparative study of both is presented, focusing on security and audience size. Results show that larger key hierarchies can supply bigger audiences, but offer less security against statistical attacks. The opposite happens for shorter key hierarchies.
this kind is presented in [14] . Churn effects depend also on the topology chosen, which3 A dynamic key hierarchy Key hierarchies are not new: they have been extensively used in the Digital Video Broadcast business for near two decades now [8] [12] [22] . TV conditional access systems usually rely on a static hierarchy. The schemes proposed in this paper introduce the possibility of increasing/decreasing the number of levels employed in the hierarchy, depending on the audience size. The smaller the audience is, the shorter the hierarchy is, and vice versa.
Adding a new key on top of the hierarchy at a given moment allows refreshing those below more frequently. This is due to the fact that the highest key must be refreshed against the Key Server, but the others can be renewed via the peer-to-peer network, as will be shown next. Thus, for high interest events a new key can be introduced on the top. The frequency of the refreshment decreases as we climb on the hierarchy. In addition to this, enlarging the hierarchy allows to supply bigger audiences, since the number of communications against the Key Server decrease dramatically.
The problem with large key hierarchies is that the top-level key stands for long periods of time: an attacker has then more time to guess it. Dynamic changes of the key hierarchy seek avoiding this risk when audience size does not require the use of so many key levels. By shortening the hierarchy the top level key is refreshed at a higher rate.
The following sections explain how both schemes work, and how key hierarchies are changed dynamically.
The Complete Key Distribution Scheme
As mentioned in section 1, the idea behind this approach is to deliver the key that encrypts the stream (named CW for Control Word) in a CW-message by using the peer-to-peer network itself. This scheme suits mesh-like networks gracefully, introducing very little overhead and achieving a good security level, as will be shown later.
The key hierarchy length can vary from one to three levels. Next, the three flavors are presented. How to change among them will be explained hereafter.
The One-Level flavor is the simplest of the three, and requires contacting the Key Server at a high frequency (within minutes). The Two-Level scheme increases complexity by adding a second level, allowing avoiding contact with the Key Server for hours. Finally, the Three-Level flavor permits a client to play the content for even days without connecting to the Key Server, by adding a third key over the two others.
One-Level flavor
The One Level Complete Key approach employs a centralized client-server architecture for distribution of the key that encrypts the stream. This key, CW , is refreshed periodically within seconds or minutes.
The refreshment process requires the client to authenticate against the Key Server. CW is sent under a secure protocol such as TLS. Connections are client-server, thus not exploiting the benefits of the peer-to-peer network. For performance enhancement, several successive CW s can be sent in every communication, thus dividing the number of necessary connections to the Key Server by the number of CW s in each message.
The simplicity of the refreshment process has a dramatic impact on the audience size for this flavor: only a very small set of clients can be maintained, since every client asks the Key Server directly at a very high frequency. Moreover, secure protocols as TLS impose an overhead on communications (time and number of messages).
On the contrary, the security level is very high, since high rate refreshment avoids statistical attacks on CW : the impact of an attacker guessing the key at a given time (by brute force or a weakness of the symmetric encryption) is very low. Furthermore, no sensitive information is stored for a long time in the client side. The main risk is the client distributing CW voluntarily.
Two-Level flavor
The multimedia stream is encrypted with CW , which is renewed at a high frequency (similar to the One-Level case). CW is no longer distributed via client-server connections with the Key Server: it is encrypted with SK (Service Key), the second level key in the hierarchy. The result is encapsulated in a CW-message, which is released into the peerto-peer network. Peers themselves distribute the CW-message as needed. The message may contain several successive refreshments of CW , if desired. This, as mentioned above, enhances performance of the network, but weakens scheme's security.
SK lifetime is in the order of hours: that means that after this time clients must ask the Key Server for a new SK. The request is done under TLS.
Due to the introduction of a second key, clients can receive refreshments of CW and decrypt the stream for hours without communicating with the Key Server (there is a small set of clients that communicate constantly with the Key Server, actually: those are the ones which introduce the CW-messages into the peer-to-peer network). Thus, a larger number of clients can be served. What's more, communications among peers do not suffer from overhead since they are done under a non-encrypted channel (CW-messages are encrypted themselves).
Privacy analysis for CW is similar to that shown for the One Level Complete Key approach. The risk of SK being compromised is low, since it is sent to clients under TLS. As in One Level Share Based, an attacker would have to guess the key a reasonable time before it is renewed. Guessing it later would be useless.
Three-Level flavor
The Two Level Complete Key approach encrypts the stream with CW , and CW with SK. The present flavor, as can be guessed, employs a new key level to distribute SK. The new key is called T (authorization Token). The Key Server encrypts SK and includes it into a message named SK-message, which is injected into the peer-to-peer network. T is renewed upon days or even weeks via client-server TLS communications against the Key Server.
T 's large lifetime allows to dramatically increase the period for which a client can decrypt the content without communicating with the Key Server. Hence, very large audiences can be reached by using this flavor, say, tenths of thousands. Security, on the other hand, decreases because of the same reason: an attacker would have several days or even weeks to decrypt T , which would lead to being able to play the content. T 's lifetime can be adjusted as necessary to make attackers' life harder (losing audience size, though).
Changing among flavors
The Key Server initiates change from one flavor to another when the audience size surpasses a given threshold (audience size can be measured by any of the methods exposed in Section 2). When exceeding, say, several hundreds of clients, the Key Server may decide to change from One-Level flavor to Two-Level flavor. If the expected audience is very large, then the change may be from One-Level to Three-Level directly. The opposite is also valid: when audience decreases sufficiently the Key Server may decide to shorten the key hierarchy. This section explains how these changes are done.
The necessary information for a change is included in the CW-messages. That information consists of three fields: the mode in which the system currently run (field Current Level) how many messages of this kind are left before the next hierarchy change (field Left), and which mode will be used then (field Next Level). Hence, a CW-message contains:
-One or more successive CW s (not encrypted for One-Level, encrypted with SK for Two and Three-Level). -"Current Level" field.
-"Left" field.
-"Next Level" field.
Joining peers need the field "Current Level" so they can know the mode the system is running on. Figure 1 shows an example: the system operates in One-Level mode and plans to change to Two-Level mode. The figure depicts the CW-messages generated by the Key Server. The example starts at moment t = 0. Change is finished at moment t = f . Each CW-message contains three CW s. At moment t = 0 the Key Server generates the first CW-message, and an SK-message which contains a brand new SK. When receiving the CW-message under TLS, a client knows that a mode change is happening soon, because of the values in "Left" and "Next Level". Then, the client obtains the SK-message from the Key Server under TLS before t = f . The CW-message at t = m is the last one served under TLS by the Key Server. At moment t = f the client retrieves the CW-message from the peer-to-peer network and decrypts its content by using SK. From that moment on the system runs in Two-Level mode, and fields "Left" and "Next Level" indicate 0, until a new mode change is started. 
Security and efficiency considerations for the Complete Key approach
It is clear that as key hierarchy length increases, audience size follows: this is due to the fact that the major part of the clients only contact the Key Server to refresh the highest key (SK in Two-Level and T in Three-Level). The higher the key is, the longer its lifetime, hence less connections are required. Furthermore, to avoid bottlenecks when changing the highest key, requests for it can be made at a random moment before expiration of the current one. If requests from other peers follow a uniform distribution then a homogeneous requests rate will be obtained. This makes workload for the Key Server more bearable.
Security is based in symmetric encryption for key distribution within the peer-to-peer network and in TLS communications with the Key Server. If keys are generated in a secure way then it will be very difficult for an attacker to break a key in a time short enough to get some benefit out of it.
However, having keys with long lifetime has its drawbacks: if the key on top is compromised, then the attacker will gain access to the content for a long time. What's more, the attacker may share the content and the key with others. That is why it is important (1) to adjust keys' lifetimes as tight as possible and (2) 
The Share-Based Key Distribution Scheme
The problem with the Complete Key Distribution approach is that its One-Level flavor can only be used for tiny audience sizes. TLS communications consume time and resources and only a little set of clients can be supplied using the One-Level flavor. This is not useful. The Share-Based is similar to the Complete Key scheme mentioned above but differs in the fact that it makes use of secret sharing techniques to perform key distribution. Due to this, the scheme shows some desirable features:
-The dynamic key hierarchy presents two flavors, instead of three, but can reach similar audience sizes than the Complete Key approach. -The key distribution process requires very little computational effort, at the price of very little overhead. This is very convenient for small devices, such as smart phones or PDAs. -It naturally suits multi-tree overlay topologies.
Secret sharing can be defined as follows:
To distribute a secret S in n shares, needing t ≤ n shares to reconstruct it, and being this impossible with a number of shares below t (threshold).
The Shamir Threshold Secret Sharing Scheme is the most popular among the several existing secret sharing methods. A detailed description can be found in [19] [21] .
The present scheme uses Secret Sharing to refresh CW . Here, one of the shares is given a higher weight than the others, and CW cannot be reconstructed without it. We have named this "important share" M S (Master Secret) and the "regular shares", SS (Secondary Shares). M S stands for several hours, and CW is refreshed by renewing the different SSs. How M S is refreshed depends on the flavor. More details are given next.
One-Level flavor
The One Level Share Based approach employs more information pieces than its Complete Key counterpart, but is still one-level in the sense that only a key is distributed.
The stream is encrypted with a key called CW , which is refreshed at a frequency within seconds or minutes. The distribution of CW is accomplished by making use of a secret sharing method as follows. For each refreshment of CW the Key Server generates as many shares as desired and includes them (without encryption) in separate messages, which are injected into the peer-to-peer network. The shares are named SSs: Secondary Shares. We call the messages that contain them SS-messages. Peers (clients) ask the network for SS-messages and resend them as needed. By collecting a minimum number of SSs (this number is called threshold) a subkey can be generated by using secret sharing. This subkey receives the name of P S Partial Share. The Key Server may generate and inject as many SSs as desired. Note that SS-messages and hence SSs are not encrypted and can be known publicly.
On the other hand, every peer authenticates against the Key Server and receives via TLS a piece of information named M S (Master Share), which must remain secret to outsiders. CW can be computed by means of a one-way function (we name it F ) that takes as input a combination of M S and P S. F is not defined in this paper, and can be designed as desired. It should be complex enough, though, to prevent brute force attacks against M S. Refreshment rate of M S is within hours. This reduces the number of requests the Key Server must attend, hence allowing audience size to rise, say to thousands of clients.
Privacy of CW is achieved by keeping secret M S and refreshing it. Security against brute force attacks against CW is achieved by refreshing SS and, therefore P S. The global security of the system depends on the robustness of the F function. If an attacker cannot guess M S a reasonable time before it is refreshed then this scheme can be considered secure enough. M S lifetime can be adjusted as necessary for this purpose. Risk and impact of directly compromising CW is low due to the high refreshment rate. Figure 3 shows the composition and origin of every piece of information involved. 
Two-Level flavor
This flavor allows the Share Based approach to reach a larger audience. CW encrypts the stream. It is distributed in the same manner as in the One-Level flavor. The novelty consists of distributing M S throughout the peer-to-peer network: the Key Server encrypts M S with a new level key, named T (authorization Token), and the result is injected into the network inside a new type of message, namely MS-message. Peers distribute it as necessary. M S's lifetime is still of several hours. T is renewed under TLS against the Key Server. Its lifetime is in the order of days.
T 's large lifetime allows to increase dramatically the period for which a client can decrypt the content without communicating with the Key Server. Hence, very large audiences can be reached by using this flavor. Security, on the other hand, decreases because of the same reason: an attacker would have several days or even weeks to try to compromise T , which would lead to being able to play the content. T 's lifetime can be adjusted as necessary to make attackers' life harder (though losing audience size). Additionally, function F must be carefully chosen.
Changing among flavors
Flavor change is performed when audiences exceeds (or goes under) a given threshold. The change is carried out in the same way than in Section 4.4: when informing about next change the necessary information is included in SS-message fields "Left" and "Next Level". Next we show how changes are done. Figure 4 depicts the details of flavor changing. We assume that the first notification occurs at moment t = 0 and change ends at t = f .
One-Level
Two-Level -Get T from Key Server between t=0 and t=f -Get MS-message from network between t=0 and t=f -Get CW-messages from network from t=f on -Get MS from Key Server between t=0 and t=f -Get CW-messages from network from t=f on Regarding efficiency, this scheme shows several advantages. First, the refreshment process requires very little computational resources: if Reed-Solomon codes are used then P S can be calculated by means of a Fast Fourier Transform, which is computed efficiently at a very low computational cost [4] [18] . Furthermore, the fact that SS-messages are not encrypted helps in that sense too. If M S has not expired for a peer, gathering each SS only requires a communication: request and response. This speeds communications up. By appropriately adjusting the threshold (the minimum number of SS-messages needed to compute CW ) and the number of successive updates of CW that can be calculated with t SS-messages (that is, the number of successive shares included in each SS-message), keys for a long playing time can be obtained without communicating with the Key Server.
Updates of M S are far apart in time and peers can ask for it with anticipation for subscription channels, making the requests rate follow a uniform distribution. This allows the Key Server to attend a bigger number of clients, favoring scalability of the net. Additionally, the update does not depend on arrivals or leavings of peers.
Another important advantage is the possibility for peers to be members of many peer-to-peer networks, each one for a different multimedia channel. Peers can even serve SS-messages and MS-messages for channels they are not subscribed to: possessing only the SSs for a channel does not allow to regenerate a valid CW , and MS-messages are encrypted with their corresponding T .
Regarding security, considerations are similar to those of section 4.5. However, there is one important difference: CW refreshment is carried out by means of a secret sharing technique and function F . Sharing techniques are secure enough to not to be worried about [19] [21], but F should be chosen very carefully. If a hash function is involved, then its output should be long enough to withstand brute-force attacks for a period of time similar at least to SK's lifetime. Signature of every CW-message and MS-message may be also implemented to avoid denial-of-service attacks.
We believe that security considerations make inappropriate the addition of a third level key to the Share Based approach. Anyway, if desired, a new key could be added to encrypt and distribute T . Its lifetime could be in the order of a month. The DVB industry has battled with the set-top box key theft problem for years, still a reliable and durable solution has not been found. The more time an attacker has to study a key, the easier will be guessing and sharing it.
Comparison of Complete Key Distribution Scheme and
Share-Based Key Distribution Scheme Table 1 sums up both schemes, focusing on audience size and security against fraud. Each flavor is assigned a security level based on the risk of key compromise and its consequences. The best suited scenario is also assigned. Figures 5 and 6 compare ideal reachable audience size and security for both schemes. The main conclusion that can be extracted is that each Share-Based flavor can supply similar audience sizes than the Complete Key approach, employing a shorter key hierarchy. On the other hand, the Complete Key method offers more security. Therefore, Complete Key should be used for small and medium audience scenarios and Share-Based for very large ones. We believe, also, that the Share-Based is more appropriate for set-top boxes, since these devices incorporate less computational capacities. 
Conclusions and future work
This paper introduces two novel key distribution schemes for live multimedia peer-to-peer overlays, which share a common new feature: the possibility of dynamically changing the number of levels in the key hierarchy. This is motivated by the fact that the larger the key hierarchy is, the more audience can be supplied, but the more time the highest level key is exposed. Hence, the key hierarchy employed should be shortened whenever possible. However, it can be enlarged if audience size requires it.
The first scheme introduced, the Complete Key Distribution Scheme, is simple and direct. It fits scenarios where a low exposure time is required for keys, preferably on top of mesh-like topologies. The second one, the Share-Based Key Distribution Scheme, is similar to the Complete Key scheme, but employs a Secret Sharing technique to refresh the lowest level key. It suits better multi-tree topologies and high audience scenarios, while needing little computational power. This last feature makes it more appropriate for set-top boxes. Additionally, the Share-Based approach outperforms Complete Key because it requires less hierarchy levels and computational cost. On both schemes, a smart key hierarchy level adjustement will adjust the higher level key exposure time to the minimum possible, depending on audience size.
Our plans for the near future are to implement and test both schemes in a peer-to-peer simulator and to study a more efficient top level key distribution to address the problem of receiving a large number of requests produced by flash crowd situations. Additionally, it is interesting to consider a fusion of both schemes (not covered in this paper): the Complete Key One-Level and Two-Level flavors might be used for small and medium-size audiences, while the Share-Based Two-Level flavor would be employed for larger audiences.
